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During preschool years, major developments occur in both executive function
and theory of mind (ToM), and several studies have demonstrated a correlation
between these processes. Research on the development of inhibitory control (IC) has
distinguished between more cognitive, “cool” aspects of self-control, measured by
conflict tasks, that require inhibiting an habitual response to generate an arbitrary one,
and “hot,” affective aspects, such as affective decision making, measured by delay
tasks, that require inhibition of a prepotent response. The aim of this study was to
investigate the relations between 3- and 4-year-olds’ performance on a task measuring
false belief understanding, the most widely used index of ToM in preschoolers, and
three tasks measuring cognitive versus affective aspects of IC. To this end, we tested
101 Italian preschool children in four tasks: (a) the Unexpected Content False Belief
task, (b) the Conflict task (a simplified version of the Day–Night Stroop task), (c) the
Delay task, and (d) the Delay Choice task. Children’s receptive vocabulary was assessed
by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary test. Children’s performance in the False Belief
task was significantly related only to performance in the Conflict task, controlling for
vocabulary and age. Importantly, children’s performance in the Conflict task did not
significantly correlate with their performance in the Delay task or in the Delay Choice
task, suggesting that these tasks measure different components of IC. The dissociation
between the Conflict and the Delay tasks may indicate that monitoring and regulating
a cool process (as flexible categorization) may involve different abilities than monitoring
and regulating a hot process (not touching an available and highly attractive stimulus or
choosing between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed one). Moreover, our
findings support the view that “cool” aspects of IC and ToM are interrelated, extending
to an Italian sample of children previous findings on an association between self-control
and ToM.
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Introduction
Over the past 20 years there have been significant improvements
in research on two milestones of cognitive development, theory
of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF). In both these
domains of cognition, major developments occur between the
ages of 3 and 5 years.
Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states, such
as emotions, beliefs, and intentions to oneself and to other
people. Mental state understanding helps the child to make
behavioral predictions about how people will act (Perner and
Lang, 1999). An important transition in the development of
a ToM, emerging around the age of 4 years, is the explicit
understanding that a person can be mistaken about the world,
that is, the comprehension of false belief and the distinction
between appearance and reality (Perner et al., 1987). Before this
age, children have difficulties in understanding that a false belief
can cause one to search for an object in the wrong place, and
children tend not to manipulate other people’s behavior by lying
or deceiving (Sodian et al., 1991).
Prototypical tests for ToM, including the Deceptive
Container task and the Appearance- Reality task, measure
the representational nature of mental states, and are failed by
most preschoolers at age 3 but are grasped by age 5. The most
frequently used measure for assessing ToM at around 4 years of
age is the ‘False-Belief task.’ The standard version requires the
unexpected transfer of a wanted object, so that the protagonist
has a false belief about the location of the object, and children
are asked to predict where the protagonist will look for the
object (Perner and Lang, 1999). At 3 years of age almost all
children answer wrongly with the actual location of the object,
whereas most children of 4 years and older answer correctly.
False belief performance shows a similar developmental pattern
across various countries and task manipulations: preschoolers
progress from below-chance performance to above-chance
performance, suggesting that understanding of belief and mind
exhibits conceptual change in the preschool years (Wellman
et al., 2001, 2006).
Some studies have suggested that having one or more siblings
to interact with at home promotes ToM understanding (Perner
et al., 1994; Jenkins and Astington, 1996). Children with siblings
have access to other children’s mind via arguments, reciprocal
engagement in pretend play and child-oriented conversation
(McAlister and Peterson, 2013). Moreover, many studies have
shown that high-functioning children with autism spectrum
disorders exhibit deficits in ToM understanding as measured by
False Belief tasks. These deficits do not emerge in control groups
of subjects with Down’s syndrome, general retardation or specific
language delays (Sodian and Frith, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1995).
Executive functioning (EF) refers to higher-order self-
regulatory cognitive processes that enable a person to engage
in flexible goal-directed behaviors, including the control of
attention, and motor responses, resistance to interference and
delay of gratification (Carlson et al., 2004a). EF has been
frequently associated with the prefrontal cortex, which is one of
the slowest developing brain areas; also, EF is generally regarded
as non-social and domain general (Hughes and Ensor, 2007).
There is a growing evidence that executive function is not a
unitary construct, but rather involves a series of distinct processes
under the control of the frontal lobe, including working memory,
IC, and task switching (Garon et al., 2008; Duckworth and Kern,
2011; Miyake and Friedman, 2012). Important developments in
typically developing children in IC occur in the first 6 years of
life. The first signs of inhibition (such as the ability to ignore
distraction and stay focused, or to resist making a habitual
response to produce a new and more adaptive one), are evident
by 12 months of age, when infants succeed in the A-not-B
and object retrieval tasks (Diamond, 2006). In the preschool
period, children make important improvements in self-control
over actions, thoughts and emotions (Carlson, 2005; Lewis and
Carpendale, 2009). Three-years-old children have difficulty in
waiting for a reward, in staying on-task in the face of tempting
distractions, and in learning a reverse-reward contingency task
(in which they should point to a small amount of candies in order
to receive a larger amount). In contrast, 4-year-olds are able to
exert more self-control, and in the reverse-reward contingency
task they point to the undesired option in order to get the other
one (Carlson et al., 2005).
Although EF is considered a domain-general construct, a
distinction has been made between the relatively hot affective
aspects of EF and more purely cognitive, cool aspects (Metcalfe
and Mischel, 1999; Zelazo and Muller, 2002). Whereas cool EF is
more likely to be involved in relatively abstract, decontextualized
problems, hot EF is required when the regulation of affect
and motivation is solicited by the task (Zelazo et al., 2005).
Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) formulated the hypothesis of a
brain network model in which self-control occurs through the
interplay between a bottom–up, affective ‘go’ system, labeled the
“hot system,” and a top–down, cognitive system, labeled the “cool
system.” The hot system develops earlier and is under stimulus
control. The cool system develops later and is under self-control.
Involvement of the hot systemmay be related to an over-focusing
on visible reward and lower self-control. Garon et al. (2012)
used this model to interpret the results of a recent study on the
development of future-oriented self-control. The study explored
factors underlying 2-, 3-, and 4-years-old preschoolers’ capacity
to make future-oriented choices using a delay-of-gratification
choice task. When choosing between two reward, with the larger
being delayed, children have to consider two variables – the
quantity of the reward, which implicates the bottom–up system,
and the temporality of the reward, which implicates the top–
down system. Their findings indicated that children made more
choices to delay gratification as the quantity of the reward
increased. Looking at age-related differences, Garon et al. (2012)
argue that, while 2-year-olds focused on quantity and 3-year-olds
showed a mixed pattern, 4-year-olds were able to consider both
time and quantity together in making their choices.
Two different classes of tasks have been used to measure IC
in the preschool period (Carlson andMoses, 2001). The first class
(Delay tasks) evaluates affective (“hot”) aspects of IC and includes
measures of children’s ability to delay, control, or suppress an
impulsive response. An example of this class of tasks is the Gift
delay task (Kochanska et al., 2000), in which an experimenter tells
the child not to have a look while the experimenter noisily wraps
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 872
Bellagamba et al. Theory-of-mind and inhibitory control in children
a present. Children’s waiting ability on this and other ‘delay’ tasks
gets better across the preschool years. Another classical delay
measure is the Delay of gratification task (Mischel et al., 1989).
In this task, 4-years-old children waited longer to receive a larger
reward (two marshmallows rather than one) when they were
encouraged to cognitively transform the reward (for instance, by
imagining the marshmallows as fluffy clouds) rather than when
they were told to focus on the arousing qualities of the reward
(i.e., its taste). A distinctive feature of Delay tasks is that the
child must maintain a course of action in the face of continual
competition from an available, tempting alternative. In fact, after
the initial choice of delaying gratification, the immediate reward
remains available throughout the delay; thus, the decision to
wait for the preferred reward needs to be sustained during the
entire delay, since the child can reverse the initial choice at
any time by picking the smaller or less preferred item. This is
different from what happens in the Delay Choice task, which
is considered a further measure of “hot” IC. In this task, the
subject faces a choice between a smaller immediate option and
a larger delayed option and, once the choice is made, there is
no possibility to modify it (Addessi et al., 2014). The second
class (Conflict tasks) evaluates more cognitive (“cool”) aspects
of IC and requires children to inhibit an habitual response to
generate an arbitrary one. An example of conflict task is the
Day–Night Stroop task developed by Gerstadt et al. (1994). This
task requires children to say ‘day’ when a black card depicting
the moon and the stars is shown and ‘night’ when a white card
depicting a yellow sun is shown; thus, the expected response has
to be suppressed. As with delay tasks, children’s performance
on this and similar conflict tasks improves gradually during the
preschool years.
The link between ToM and EF was first noted in the context of
research on individuals with autism. Ozonoff et al. (1991) found
that high-functioning children with autism were impaired both
on measures of ToM and on tasks assessing EF, and suggested
that the maturation of the same brain structures that underlie
ToM and EF may be the cause of the observed correlations. Later
studies strongly supported a general link between ToM and EF
in typically developing preschoolers, and highlighted a special
connection between ToM and IC (Carlson and Moses, 2001;
Perner et al., 2002; Carlson et al., 2004a; Sabbagh et al., 2006;
Hughes and Ensor, 2007; Henning et al., 2011; McAlister and
Peterson, 2013). The correlations between individual differences
in EF performances and ToM tasks in these studies are notable
and remain even when factors such as age and verbal ability are
controlled. A few studies suggested that the link between ToM
and EF may be present even earlier than the preschool years,
when measuring these emerging abilities may be challenging
(Carlson et al., 2004a; Hughes and Ensor, 2005; Bellagamba et al.,
2014; Poulin-Dubois and Yott, 2014). Despite the large number
of studies that addressed the relationship between ToM and EF,
only a few studies included both delay and conflict components
of IC in their measures. Carlson and Moses (2001) examined
the relation between individual differences in IC and ToM
performance in preschool children of 3- and 4-years of age using
a variety of tasks. The ToM battery incorporated measures of false
belief, deceptive pointing and appearance-reality. The EF battery
(10 measures) included conflict tasks and delay tasks. A multiple
regression analysis revealed that the Conflict scale was a highly
significant predictor of ToM, holding the control variables (age,
gender, and verbal ability) and the Delay scale constant. The
Delay scale, however, did not contribute uniquely to variance
in ToM over and above the control variables and the Conflict
scale. The authors noted that the abilities assessed by Conflict
tasks may have been more central to ToM reasoning than those
assessed by Delay tasks. In a follow-up study, Carlson et al. (2002)
again found a different pattern for conflict and delay measures.
The conflict tasks correlated with ToM controlling for age and
intelligence. In contrast, the correlation between the Delay tasks
and ToM was not significant. The authors hypothesized that
the Conflict tasks impose loads on both working memory and
inhibitory capacity, whereas the Delay tasks impose a substantial
inhibitory load but only minimal working memory demands
(Carlson and Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002).
Hala et al. (2003) examined the relation between false belief
understanding and executive function including a battery of
both conflict and delay tasks. They found no relationship
between the gift delay task and ToM, in contrast to a strong
association between conflict and ToM scores. Like Carlson and
Moses (2001), also Hala et al. (2003) suggest that the difference
between conflict and delay tasks is principally in the working
memory: conflict tasks demand that children keep in mind the
pertinent rules as well as inhibit an impulsive response. Kain
and Perner (2005), however, noted that the claim that the delay
task poses lower memory demands than the conflict task is not
very convincing because in delay tasks children have to keep
reminding themselves for some time that they were instructed
not to touch a forbidden object. Kain and Perner (2005) suggested
that emotional and reward factors could provide another reason
why the delay task bears a lower and less robust correlation with
ToM tasks than does the conflict task. These authors noted that
the delay tasks activate emotional and reward processing, which
are known from other tasks (e.g., gambling task; Bechara et al.,
1998) to be associated to the orbitofrontal cortex, whereas conflict
tasks activate the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the anterior
cingulated cortex, which are also involved in ToM.
Bellagamba et al. (2014) investigated the concurrent relations
between 18- and 24-month-olds’ performance on two tasks
measuring inhibitory control (IC; a Conflict and a Delay task)
and internal state language abilities in 61 Italian speaking
children and found that the ability to refer to mental states
through language was significantly and specifically related only to
performance on the conflict measure of IC, evenwhen vocabulary
size was controlled for.
Carlson et al. (2004b) examined the relative contribution of
two aspects of executive function – IC and planning ability – to
ToM in 3- and 4-year-olds. Children were given two standard
ToM measures (Appearance–Reality and False Belief), three IC
tasks (Bear/Dragon, Whisper, and Gift Delay), three planning
tasks (Tower of Hanoi, Truck Loading, and Kitten Delivery), and
a receptive vocabulary test.Multiple regression analyses indicated
that only the two conflict inhibition tasks (Bear/Dragon and
Whisper) were significantly related to ToM after accounting for
age, receptive vocabulary, and planning, while the Gift Delay task
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was not. Finally, in a very recent study, Carlson et al. (2015) found
similar results, showing that children’s better performance on a
conflict task (Bear/Dragon) predicted higher scores in ToM tasks
that presented both low and high levels of executive demands
(Think-Know and Sources of Knowledge were low demanding,
in addition to False Belief and Appearance-Reality, which were
high demanding). In contrast, once again, the Gift Delay task was
not related to either of the two kinds of ToM tasks.
A recent meta-analytic review of 102 studies reported a
moderate to strong association between EF and false belief
understanding in early childhood (Devine and Hughes, 2014),
indicating that among typically developing 3- to 6-years olds
there is a genuine association between individual differences in
EF and false belief understanding. Also, the correlation between
EF and false belief understanding was similar in magnitude
from ages 3 to 6, and this consistency is remarkable as this
developmental period is associated with rapid gains in both
domains. Moreover, Devine and Hughes (2014) noted that false
belief understanding is more strongly associated with conflict
inhibition than with performance in the Gift Delay task and
Sticker Delay task, but that only a very few studies evaluating
the relationship between ToM and EF included also measures of
delay of gratification in their analyses. Devine and Hughes (2014)
also underlined that the Delay task measure cannot be considered
equivalent to the Delay of Gratification task, since only the second
task presents the child with a choice between a smaller reward
now and a larger reward later.
On the basis of the above findings, the main goal of the
present study was to examine the relationships between explicit
false belief understanding, a delay measure of IC and a conflict
measure of IC in a group of typically developing Italian
children, controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. To our
knowledge, this is the first study analyzing the relation between
false belief understanding and IC in preschoolers belonging to
this population [although a study by Valle et al. (2015) has
recently addressed this issue in adolescents and early adults].
Our understanding of how children develop in ToM and EF
is largely based on Anglo-American, French- and German-
speaking children, but there is an increasing focus on cultural
differences in the development of children’s understanding of
mind (Lillard, 1998). Culture plays an important role in shaping
how parents think and act out their parental role (Bornstein,
1991), which in turn interacts with universal pathways of infant
development. Hsu and Lavelli (2005) found both cross-cultural
similarities and distinctive differences in social/affective aspects
of feeding between Italian and American mothers. In their
interactions with their infants, Italian mothers tend to promote
the expression of positive affect and social relatednesswith others,
while American mothers tend to encourage independence and
self-reliance. According to Lecce and Hughes (2010), cultural
differences in the expression of emotions and in the focus on self-
control could contribute to the differences in ToM performances
in British and Italian children. Parental education, different styles
in maternal use of mental state terms, and differences in the
onset of formal schooling – which begins at age 5 in Britain,
but at age 6 in Italy – are considered factors that may also
contribute to the advantage observed in their study by British
children on false belief understanding, compared to a matched
sample of Italian children. Also, findings on the relation between
ToM and EF from cross-cultural studies appear mixed. Sabbagh
et al. (2006) suggested that children growing in two very different
cultures, China and the United States, showed considerable cross-
cultural synchrony in the association between ToM and EF tasks,
suggesting that this relation may be universal and not changed
by cultural differences. A later study, involving children from
three oriental cultures, instead suggested that the patterns of
executive skills and their correlates with standard false belief
measures are very different from those found inWestern cultures
(Lewis et al., 2009). Oriental children tend to outperformWestern
children on executive function tasks, whereas they do not exhibit
these advanced levels of performance in false belief tests. The
above study also reports a lack of association between false
belief understanding and EF composite measures for Korean,
Japanese, and Chinese children. Therefore, as noted by Devine
and Hughes (2014), a systematic comparison of the impact
of cultural differences is important to understand whether the
relation between EF and ToM does vary in strength across
different cultures.
Given that previous studies have reported an association
between ToM tasks and conflict tasks in children between 3 and
6 years of age (Carlson and Moses, 2001; Perner et al., 2002;
Carlson et al., 2004a; Hughes and Ensor, 2007; Henning et al.,
2011), we hypothesized that there would be a stronger relation
between ToM and the conflict measure of IC rather than between
ToM and the delay measure of IC. In line with the proposal of
Kain and Perner (2005), we expected false belief understanding to
be more strongly related to a task requiring the child to overcome
a dominant response and start a conflicting one, than to a task
measuring the capacity to delay a response toward an highly
attractive stimulus.
Materials and Methods
Data were collected during a study on children’s self-control
ability, focusing on how symbolic representations of the reward
affected performance in a Delay Choice Task (Addessi et al.,
2014), and whether displacement activities improved children’s
performance in the Delay Task (Pecora et al., 2014). Data for the
Delay Choice Task, Conflict Task, and Delay Task were partly
analyzed in the aforementioned studies, whereas data for the
False Belief task are completely original.
Participants
Participants were 101 Italian preschool children, 51 3-year-olds
(mean age = 36.13, range = 35.07–37.0; 25 boys and 26 girls)
and 50 4-year-olds (mean age = 48.11, range = 47.02–49.0; 27
boys and 23 girls). Children were sourced from kindergarten and
were all healthy. They came from middle-class Italian families (as
determined by parental educational level) living in Rome. The
children’s parents signed an informed consent form outlining the
aim of the study. The study complied with the ethical guidelines
of the Italian Association of Psychology (AIP) and were approved
by the Ethics Committee of ISTC-CNR.
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Procedure
Tasks were administered to the children in a quiet room
by two qualified experimenters, who alternated their role as
experimenter and assistant across sessions. The experimenter
administered the tasks and the assistant quietly recorded
children’s performance on the protocol sheet. The entire session
was also video-recorded. Each child was given five tasks in one
single session and in a fixed order: (a) the Delay choice task, (b)
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT, Dunn and Dunn,
1981), (c) the Unexpected Content False Belief Task (Perner et al.,
1987; Gopnik and Astington, 1988), (d) the Conflict Task, a
simplified version of the Day–Night Stroop Task (adapted from
Gerstadt et al., 1994), and (e) the Delay Task (adapted from
Vaughn et al., 1986 and Kochanska et al., 2000). Depending on the
parents’ preference, the experiment was administered either in a
separate room of the kindergarten that the child attended (65%
of 3-year-olds, and 78% of 4-year-olds) or at home. Each testing
session lasted around 40 min. At the end of the experiment, each
child was given a small gift and the parents were given a DVD
of the recorded experiment to thank them. Data collection was
carried out between November 2009 and May 2011.
Measures
Delay Choice Task
Children were presented with choices between a small option
and a large option in three experimental conditions (Food Delay,
Low-Symbolic Token Delay, and High-Symbolic Token Delay),
in which the smaller option was immediately available, whereas
the larger option was delayed by 80 s. Children were also tested in
two control conditions (Food Control and High-Symbolic Token
Control), in which both options were immediately available.
We employed a between-subject design, counterbalancing gender
and age. Each subject participated in a single session of six trials,
including two familiarization trials (forced choices, with only one
option available, presented at the beginning of the session), and
four experimental trials (binary choices). In all conditions, the
dependent variable was the proportion of choices of the larger
delayed option.
In the Food conditions, children chose between visible food
amounts, whereas in both Token conditions children were
presented with two cards depicting, respectively, two dots and
six dots (Low-Symbolic Token condition) or a mouse and
an elephant (High-Symbolic Token condition). After choosing
one of the two cards, the subject could exchange it with the
experimenter for obtaining the corresponding food amount.
The food type was previously agreed upon with the parents on
the basis of children’s preferences and/or diet restrictions. For
further details on the methodology, please see Addessi et al.
(2014).
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
We used the Italian version of the PPVT-R (Dunn and Dunn,
1981, adapted by Stella et al., 2000), a measure of receptive
vocabulary. For each item out of a series of 175 items, the child
was asked to select from a set of four pictures the one best
illustrating the meaning of an orally presented word. Testing
continued until the child erred on eight consecutive items.
False Belief Task
We used the Unexpected Content False Belief Task (Perner
et al., 1987; Gopnik and Astington, 1988). The children were
shown a container of a desirable and highly familiar candy (a
Smarties box) and asked to state what they thought was in the
container (Control question). The experimenter then opened the
container and showed that the box actually contained something
unexpected (a pencil). The pencil was then put back into the box
and the box closed again. The subjects were then asked the first
experimental question about their own former false belief: “When
you first saw this box, before we opened it, what did you think was
inside?” Then they were asked the second experimental question,
about someone else, Mary, who had never looked inside the box:
“What will Mary think is in here?” The children were assigned
either a 0 (fail) or a 1 (pass) for the three different scores: (1) Self
attribution, (2) Other attribution, and (3) Global score (passing
both self- and other attribution). Intercoder reliability, calculated
on 20% of the sample, was 100% (index of concordance).
The Conflict Task
This task was a simplified version of the Day–Night Stroop Task
developed by Gerstadt et al. (1994) and was used to assess the
children’s capacity to inhibit a prepotent response in order to
give a conflicting one. Both Gerstadt et al. (1994) and Waston
and Bell (2013) indicate that the Day–Night Stroop task is too
difficult for 3-years-old children. We thus employed a simpler
version of the task using one set of five red and five blue cards.
The experimenter first verified that the child correctly named the
color of a red and of a blue card and then said: “Now we are
playing a game. In this game, when I show you a red card you
have to say ‘blue’ and when I show you a blue card you have to
say ‘red,’ okay?” Two training trials followed in which the children
were shown one of each type of card. If the subject hesitated, the
experimenter prompted the subject by saying: “What do you say
for this one?” If the subject responded correctly to the red card,
the experimenter praised the child and proceeded to a training
trial with the blue card. If the subject responded incorrectly or
did not respond at all on either of these trials, the experimenter
immediately reminded the subject of the rule. On the two training
trials, the experimenter gave feedback and repeated the question
as needed (up to three times). The experimenter then proceeded
to the eight test trials without feedback in a fixed random order.
The experimenter reminded the subject of the rule of the game
after the first four test trials. The dependent variable was the
total number of correct responses in the test trials. Intercoder
reliability, calculated on 20% of the sample, was 100% (index of
concordance).
The Delay Task
This task was adapted from Vaughn et al. (1986) and Kochanska
et al. (2000), and was used to assess the children’s capacity to delay
responding to an attractive stimulus. The experimenter showed
a musical box to the child, with a carillon inside that turned on
once the box was opened, and explained that the experimenter
would have to leave the room for a short time. The child was then
instructed not to touch the box in the experimenter’s absence. The
experimenter and the assistant left the room andwaited for 3min,
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but the child could interrupt the trial at any time before the 3 min
elapsed. During the delay period, the child received four yellow
toy ducks to play with.
Five different scores were derived from this task: (1) Latency
to touch the box: total time from task onset until the subject
touched the box, (2) Latency to open the box: total time from task
onset until the subject opened the box, (3) Frequency of touching
the box: number of times the subject touched the box during
the 3 min (or until the end of the trial if the child interrupted
the trial earlier), (4) Frequency of opening the box: number of
times the subject opened the box during the 3 min (or until the
end of the trial if the child interrupted the trial earlier), and (5)
Time to interruption: total time from task onset until the subject
interrupted the trial or the 3 min elapsed. All measures were
scored from videotapes. Intercoder reliability was calculated on
20% of the sample (Latency to touch the box: Spearman rs = 1.0,
N = 19; Latency to open the box: Spearman rs = 0.99, p< 0.0001,
N = 19; Frequency of touching the box: index of concordance:
91%; Frequency of opening the box: index of concordance: 95%).
Intercoder reliability was not calculated for Time to interruption
since most of the children (72%) waited until the end of the
task.
Results
Descriptive Statistics for All Tasks are Presented in Table 1.
Delay Choice Task
All 101 children participated in this task (51 were 3-year-olds and
50 were 4-year-olds), 20 in each condition, with the exception of
the High-Symbolic Token Delay condition in which there were
21 children. For analysis purposes, data were transformed by
calculating the arcsin squareroot of proportions of choices of the
larger option. As reported in Addessi et al. (2014), a factorial
ANOVA with gender and age as between-subject factors revealed
a main effect of condition, but no significant effect of gender
and age, nor any significant interaction. Here we do not discuss
the effect of condition since this was the focus of Addessi et al.
(2014).
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
All the children participated in this task, but data for one 4-
years-old are not available because of video camera failure. We
performed a factorial ANOVA with the children’s standardized
score on the PPVT as the dependent variable and with gender
and age as independent variables. There was a main effect of age:
F1,96 = 53.9, p < 0.001, = 0.36, with 4-year-olds (M = 90.8,
SD = 10.5) performing better than 3-year-olds (M = 77.6,
SD = 7.19). Gender did not significantly affect performance
(F1,96 = 1.01, p = 0.32), nor was there any significant interaction
between gender and age (F1,96 = 1.21, p = 0.27).
False Belief Task
Ninety-eight children participated in this task (48 were 3-
year-olds and 50 were 4-year-olds). Three children did not
participate because they did not answer the experimenter’s
questions (two 3-year-olds) or did not have any experience with
the candies (Smarties) used in the task (one 3-years-old). All
children passed the control question, 42% of the 3-year-olds and
68% of the 4-year-olds passed the first experimental question,
19% of the 3-year-olds and 38% of the 4-year-olds passed the
second experimental question, 15% of the 3-year-olds and 30%
of the 4-year-olds passed both first and second experimental
questions.
For each measure (First experimental question Self-
attribution, Second experimental question Other attribution,
and Global score), we performed a logistic regression with the
children’s score as dependent variable, and with gender and age
as independent variables. For both experimental questions, age
significantly predicted performance in the False Belief task (First
experimental question Self-attribution: z = 2.59, p = 0.010,
4-year-olds: M = 0.68, SD = 0.47, 3-year-olds: M = 0.42,
SD = 0.50; Second experimental question Other attribution:
z = 2.06, p = 0.040, 4-year-olds: M = 0.38, SD = 0.49, 3-
year-olds: M = 0.19, SD = 0.39). For the Global score (passing
TABLE 1 | Mean scores, SD, and ranges for all tasks, divided by age.
Task Measure 3-years-old 4-years-old
M SD Range M SD Range
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) Score 77.6 7.19 67–98 90.8 10.5 68–119
False Belief Test Self-attribution (score) 0.42 0.50 0–1 0.68 0.47 0–1
Other attribution (score) 0.19 0.39 0–1 0.38 0.49 0–1
Global score 0.15 0.36 0–1 0.30 0.46 0–1
Conflict task Correct responses (proportions) 0.45 0.39 0–1 0.78 0.31 0–1
Delay task Latency to touch (s) 100.0 58.51 1–180 113.7 69.7 2–180
Latency to open (s) 139.8 54.7 3–180 153.8 46.9 31–180
Frequency to touch (proportions) 0.007 0.009 0–0.3 0.012 0.020 0–0.080
Frequency to open (proportions) 0.003 0.007 0–0.3 0.007 0.002 0–0.010
Time to interruption (seconds) 158 39.06 49.21–180 159.5 41.19 47–180
Delay Choice Task – Food Delay Choice of the larger option (proportions) 0.70 0.28 0.25–1 0.65 0.27 0.25–1
Delay Choice Task – Low-Symbolic Token Delay Choice of the larger option (proportions) 0.57 0.29 0.25–1 0.67 0.31 0–1
Delay Choice Task High-Symbolic Token Delay Choice of the larger option (proportions) 0.50 0.24 0–0.75 0.48 0.07 0.25–0.50
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both first and second experimental questions), there was a
non-significant trend of 4-year-olds (M = 0.30, SD = 0.46) to
perform better than 3-year-olds (M = 0.15, SD = 0.36; z = 1.79,
p = 0.074). For all measures, gender did not significantly predict
performance (First experimental question-Self attribution:
z = 0.15, p = 0.88; Second experimental question Other
attribution: z = −0.57, p = 0.57; Global score: z = −0.20,
p = 0.84), nor was there any significant interaction between
gender and age (First experimental question Self-attribution:
z = −0.16, p = 0.87; Second experimental question Other
attribution: z = −0.96, p = 0.33; Global score: z = −1.36,
p = 0.17).
Conflict Task
Eighty-one children participated in this task (36 were 3-year-olds
and 45 were 4-year-olds). Twenty children did not participate
because they failed to recognize the colors (seven 3-year-olds and
two 4-year-olds), did not answer the experimenter’s questions
(six 3-year-olds) or were tested when this task had not yet
been introduced in the present study. Since one child had some
invalid trials, we converted the number of correct responses into
proportions. For analysis purposes, data were transformed by
calculating the arcsin squareroot of proportions. As reported in
Addessi et al. (2014), a factorial ANOVA with gender and age
as between-subject factors revealed a main effect of age, with
4-years-old children (M = 0.78, SD = 0.31) performing better
than 3-years-old children (M = 0.45, SE = 0.39). Gender did
not significantly affect performance, nor was there any significant
interaction between gender and age. The children’s proportion
of correct responses in this task did not significantly correlate
with their total latency to respond (combined for the eight
trials), controlling for chronological age and receptive vocabulary
(rp = 0.19, p = 0.091, N = 80).
Delay Task
Ninety-eight children participated in this task (48 were 3-year-
olds and 50 were 4-year-olds). Three children did not participate
because their caregiver was present during the task (two 3-year-
olds) or because of video camera failure (one 3-years-old). Since
the children could interrupt the trial at any time before the 3 min
elapsed, we converted frequencies of touching and opening the
box into proportions. Data were transformed by calculating the
logarithm of latencies and the arcsin squareroot of proportions.
We performed a MANOVA with, as dependent variable, the five
measures scored during the Delay Task (Latency to touch the box,
Latency to open the box, Frequency of touching the box, Frequency
of opening the box, and Time to interruption). Gender and age
did not significantly affect performance (Gender: λ = 0.97,
F5,90 = 0.59, p = 0.71; Age: λ = 0.92, F5,90 = 1.53, p = 0.19),
nor was there any significant interaction between gender and age
(λ= 0.94, F5,90 = 1.09, p = 0.37).
Relations between Tasks
First of all, we examined whether there was a correlation between
our IC measures and, if so, whether this relation would remain
after we controlled for age and receptive vocabulary. As for the
Delay Choice Task, we analyzed only data for the experimental
conditions (Food Delay, Low-Symbolic Token Delay, and High-
Symbolic Token Delay).
As shown in Table 2, performance in each experimental
condition of the Delay Choice Task was not significantly related
to any of the measures scored for the Delay Task, nor to children’s
performance in the Conflict task. Similarly, measures scored for
the Delay Task were not significantly related to performance in
the Conflict task.
The next series of analyses was aimed at specifying the relative
contribution of cool IC (as measured by the Conflict Task) and
hot IC (as measured by the Delay Choice Task and by the Delay
Task) to ToM. As shown in Table 2, the correlations between
the Other attribution and Global score measures of the False
Belief Task, respectively, and performance in the Conflict task
were significant, whereas the correlations between ToM and (i)
performance in the Delay Choice Task and (ii) measures scored
for the Delay task were not. Importantly, the relations between
ToM and performance in the Conflict Task remained significant
after controlling for effects due to age and receptive vocabulary.
Therefore, individual differences in cool IC, but not hot IC, were
related to ToM performance.
Table 2 also reports the relations between the variables
measured in each task and, respectively, chronological age and
receptive vocabulary.
Discussion
The present study investigated the relations between
performances on a task measuring false belief understanding and
three tasks measuring cognitive versus affective aspects of IC in a
sample of Italian preschool children.
Considering the range of variations in responses within each
task, and the correlation found between ToM and the conflict
measure of IC, the performances of 3-and 4-years-old Italian
children in the current study can be considered similar to
those reported in previous studies conducted with children
growing up in Western cultures. Similarly to what has been
reported in previous studies, 4-years- old children performed
better than 3-years-old children in both the False Belief and
the Conflict task, and these measures were positively associated
even after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. A direct
comparison with the study by Lecce and Hughes (2010) reporting
an advantage of British children over Italian children on ToM
tasks is not possible, since their study tested children of a different
age group (5- to 6-years-old). The conflict task that we used
was slightly different from the classical Day–Night Stroop task
employed by Gerstadt et al. (1994). While in the classical Day–
Night task the child has to say ‘day’ when shown a card with the
moon, in ourmodified version of the task the child had to say ‘red’
when a blue card was shown. In the first case the child is required
to inhibit a symbolic categorization, whereas in the second case
the child has to inhibit a perceptual categorization.
As in previous studies (Hala et al., 2003; Carlson et al.,
2004b, 2015), the children’s performance in the Delay task did
non-correlate with ToM measures. Moreover, we did not find
any effect of age on children’s performances in the Delay task.
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Since only 23% of the 3-year-olds and 46% of the 4-year-olds
waited for the entire delay (180 s) without touching the musical
box, we can exclude that there was a ceiling effect. However,
it cannot be excluded that factors such as fatigue (the Delay
task was administered at the end of the session) or experimental
setting (kindergarten vs. home) may also have had an impact on
children’s performance.
A different developmental pattern emerges from children
from non-Western cultures, with studies reporting a lack of
association between false belief understanding and composite
scores of EF (Lewis et al., 2009). Oh and Lewis (2008) reported
that Korean preschoolers tend to be 1 year ahead in executive
tasks (including both conflict and delay tasks) in comparison to
British children, whereas they are at chance level on false belief
measures at 4 years of age. For instance, in the Delay task (Gift
delay) the majority of children (72.5%) waited for the entire
delay (150 s) to touch a present. As noted by Oh and Lewis
(2008), Korean children may be very skilled in delay inhibition
probably because their culture places emphasis on patience or
because impulsive behavior tends to be punished in Korea. These
authors also noted that far Eastern countries such as China,
Japan, and Korea have a long tradition of Confucianism. Holding
parents, teachers, elders, and authority figures in high respect is
an important aspect of Confucianism and this may contribute to
young children’s self-control and obedience.
Research on the development of IC has differentiated between
cognitive components of self-control, assessed by conflict tasks
which demand inhibition and some additional cognitive load
(e.g., activate a novel response), and affective components, such as
affective decision-making that is measured by delay tasks, which
require inhibition of an impulsive response (Carlson and Moses,
2001; Perner et al., 2002; Carlson, 2005; Prencipe and Zelazo,
2005). In the present study, we did not find a correlation between
the Conflict task and the Delay task. In our view, one important
difference between conflict and delay tasks is that they set
different challenges to the child during inhibition. Conflict tasks
need a relatively abstract and decontextualized type of inhibition,
while delay tasks, which activate emotional and reward factors,
require a more affective and context-bound type of inhibition.
Our results are in line with Kain and Perner’s (2005) proposal
that emotional and reward factors could contribute to the reason
why delay tasks are not as strongly associated to ToM tasks as
conflict tasks. According to these authors, there is some evidence
that the areas of activation in the prefrontal cortex during conflict
and ToM tasks may overlap in childhood and not be the same
as the neural basis of emotional and reward processing involved
during delay tasks (Kain and Perner, 2005). Similarly, we did not
find a significant correlation between performance in the Delay
Choice task and the Delay task, in agreement with those studies
in which only a weak correlation between delay choice and delay
maintenance measures (or a lack thereof) was reported for the
same population (Schwarz et al., 1983; Duckworth and Kern,
2011; Addessi et al., 2013).
On a theoretical level, alternative reasons have been proposed
to explain the developmental link between self-control and ToM
(see Perner and Lang, 1999 for a review). With respect to
expression views (Hughes and Russell, 1993), good performances
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on standard ToM tasks demand some level of executive ability
to inhibit the true state of affairs and reflect on mental states.
With respect to emergence views, there is a functional and
ontogenetic relationship between EF and ToM, but several
proposals have been put forward for the developmental direction.
According to Perner and Lang (1999), an understanding of
mental states as causally effective representations is necessary for
the development of self-monitoring and IC. On the other hand,
Russell (1996) and Carlson and Moses (2001) hypothesized that
a certain level of executive control could be essential for the
acquisition of mental state concepts. There is not yet definitive
proof backing the expression or the emergence view (Henning
et al., 2011; Devine and Hughes, 2014) and testing the different
theoretical accounts of the relation between IC and ToM is clearly
beyond the scope of our work.
Our study, even with its limitations (including not using
a wide battery of EF and ToM tasks, and the concurrent
measurements that precludes clear causal statements) supports
the results of those studies that found a significant relation
between the ability to understand false beliefs and the conflict
(but not the delay) measures of IC. Moreover, in the present
study, delay and conflict measures were not associated, suggesting
that these tasks measure different components of IC. The
dissociation between the Conflict and the Delay task may indicate
that monitoring and regulating a hot process (not touching an
available and highly attractive stimulus) may involve different
abilities than monitoring and regulating a cool process (as
flexible categorization), and that only the latter component of
IC is developmentally linked to false belief understanding. Also
performance in the Delay Choice task and in the Delay task
did show a lack of correlation, probably because these two tasks
tackle different aspects of delay of gratification ability. Whereas
in the Delay Choice task the initial choice cannot be reconsidered
during the delay, in the Delay task the subject can modify her
choice at any time.
The lack of correlation between ToM and “hot” IC, observed
in previous studies and replicated in the present study, has
important implications on the alleged link between delay
of gratification and so-called “mental time travel” (MTT).
MTT is defined as the ability to mentally project oneself in
some future situation (Atance and Meltzoff, 2005; Suddendorf
and Corballis, 2007), and it is increasingly conceptualized as
continuous and complementary with the ability to remember
episodes on one’s past (episodic memory; Busby and Suddendorf,
2005; Addis et al., 2007). MTT has often been suggested as
a key element for planning (Atance and Meltzoff, 2006) and
delayed gratification: as Atance (2008, p. 297) argued “were
an organism not able to conceptualize a time other than
the present, then delaying would make little sense.” In turn,
MTT is typically described as a complex faculty that relies
on a variety of cognitive processes, including ToM, IC, and
working memory (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). According
to this view, (i) ToM and “hot” IC should positively correlate,
through the mediation of MTT, and (ii) subjects that are
unable to mentally project themselves in future situations should
demonstrate substantial impairment in delay tolerance. The latter
hypothesis is contradicted by recent data on amnesic individuals
with hippocampal damage and associated impairments in
episodic memory and future imagining (Kwan et al., 2012,
2013): in spite of their impaired MTT abilities, these subjects
exhibited the same delay discounting behavior observed in
demographically matched controls, thus suggesting that MTT
is not a necessary condition for delay tolerance. As for the
idea that ToM may facilitate “hot” IC, this is at odds with
previous developmental evidence (Carlson and Moses, 2001;
Carlson et al., 2002, 2015; Hala et al., 2003; Kain and Perner,
2005; Devine and Hughes, 2014), as well as with the present
findings.
The impact of our results on the MTT debate is moderated
by the fact that we did not check for MTT abilities specifically,
so we cannot be sure that the age-related improvement in ToM
observed in our sample also resulted in a similar improvement
in MTT skills (although this would be consistent with the
relationship between ToM and MTT hypothesized by most
MTT scholars). Nonetheless, in the present study ToM did not
correlate with performance in either the Delay task or the Delay
Choice task: the latter finding, in particular, suggests a lack of role
for ToM in “hot” IC. However, as for the Delay Choice task, it
cannot be excluded that the small sample size might have played
a role, and future studies should evaluate whether performance
in ToM tasks and in the Delay Choice task correlates in larger
samples. More generally, this discussion shows that (i) the
connection between ToM and delayed gratification hypothesized
by proponents of MTT as a key aspect of future-oriented
self-control (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007; Atance, 2008) is
far from being proven, and thus (ii) a more comprehensive
examination of the relationship between ToM and different
aspects of IC is urgently needed.
Conclusion
Although we did not test children with a full battery of EF
and ToM tasks, our results are stimulating and broadly in
line with previous findings. Future research on the relationship
between ToM and IC should include several conflict and delay
measures and test children in different cultures in order to better
understand the role of cognitive vs. affective components of self-
control and their specific relation to ToM development. A better
understanding of the interdependence between ToM and IC may
also come from a thorough investigation of their neural basis and
evolutionary precursors, via comparative studies.
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